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FUNDAMENTAL ELECTION RIGHTS:
ASSOCIATION, VOTING AND CANDIDACY
GARY AHRENS* AND NANCY HAUSERMAN**
INTRODUCTION
The idea of a republican form of government involves several
distinct, but mutually dependent election rights. The right to vote,
the right of free speech, the right to petition government, and the
right to associate for political purposes have all been discussed and
identified as such by the courts. However, the courts have not been
able to decide on a logical relationship between these rights; nor have
they identified which of them may be described as the prime principle
and which are its corollaries. In 1968, the Supreme Court said the
prime principle was the right to vote.' However, its decisions since
then have qualified that statement to the point that it is no longer
useful as the sole criterion for the determination of election rights,
if indeed the Court ever intended it to be used as one.
In election cases involving third party and independent candi-
dates, litigants have frequently asserted that the right to be a candi-
date belongs in the class of fundamental election rights with voting,
association, and others, but it has yet to be clearly given that status
by the Court. This article argues that it should be included as a fun-
damental right. It will demonstrate that the Court should recognize
as the basic Constitutional principle the proposition that a govern-
ment cannot exist as a democratic republic unless it protects the in-
dividual's right to freely associate and disassociate in electoral
politics; and that the right to be a candidate is intertwined with the
other corollaries to political association.
The pronouncements of the courts implicitly recognize that the
political system envisioned in the Constitution holds as a funda-
mental value the right of free association between individuals as
political equals. Association is not explicitly mentioned in the text of
the Constitution, but is the whole of which the first amendment pro-
tects: free speech, free press, assembly, petition, and voting are the
*Assistant Professor of Law, Texas Tech Law School.
"Assistant Professor, College of Business Administration, University of Iowa.
The authors were plaintiffs counsel in McCarthy v. Kopel, No. C-76-45 (N.D. Iowa,
filed Feb. 6, 1978, decided April 4, 1978).
1. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968), citing Wesberry v. Sanders,
376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964). See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
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parts. Free political association distinguishes the American political
system. Ours is not a system which is predicated on the subordina-
tion of all the members of society to one or another political organi-
zation or hierarchy; nor does it forbid any association of individuals
without specific permission from the government. In election cases,
the courts have tried to steer between the anarchy of splintered and
fractionalized parties-which would result from unstabilized political
association-and the oligarchy of one established party, even if it is
nominally split in two wings called democrat and republican, which
rigid associational control would create. The rights which have been
principally discussed in these cases, the right to vote and the right
to be a candidate, implement the right to associate for political pur-
poses. Necessary as they may be, issues of voting and candidacy are
secondary to the central problem facing the courts in these cases,
which is the reasonable control of the process of political association
and its corollary, disassociation.
BACKGROUND: PATTERNS OF ELECTION RIGHTS LITIGATION
The fact situations from which litigation has arisen generally
conform to a somewhat uniform pattern. A person who is not a
member of one of the major political parties," or who is not a
member of any political party,' tenders an application to be placed
2. Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, - U.S. -,
99 S. Ct. 983 (1979). See American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, rek. denied,
416 U.S. 1000 (1974); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971); Williams v. Rhodes, 393
U.S. 23 (1968); Communist Party v. State Bd. of Elections, 518 F.2d 517 (7th Cir. 1975);
Rose v. Hanly, No. 77-C-326 (N.D. Ill., filed March 15, 1977); Ashworth v. Fortson, 424
F. Supp. 1178 (N.D. Ga. 1976); American Party v. Jernigan, 424 F. Supp. 943 (E.D. Ark.
1977); Salera v. Tucker, 399 F. Supp. 1258 (E.D. Pa. 1975), affd 424 U.S. 959 (1976);
King v. Willis, 333 F. Supp. 670 (D. Del. 1971); Georgia Socialist Workers Party v.
Fortson, 135 F. Supp. 1035 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
3. See McCarthy v. Briscoe, 429 U.S. 1316 (1976); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S.
724 (1974); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974); Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969);
MacBride v. Exon, 558 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1977); MacBride v. Askew, 541 F.2d 465 (5th
Cir. 1977); Jones v. Hare, 440 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1971); McCarthy v. Andrus, No.
1-76-191 (D. Idaho filed Oct. 5, 1977); Cross v. Fong Eu, 430 F. Supp 1036 (N.D.Cal.
1977); Ihlenfeldt v. State Elections Bd., 425 F. Supp. 1361 (E.D. Wis. 1977); Lendall v.
Jernigan, 424 F. Supp. 951 (E.D. Ark. 1977); McCarthy v. Salmon, No. 76-C-213 (D.Vt.,
filed Oct. 7, 1976); McCarthy v. Rampton, No. 76-C-303 (D. Utah, filed Oct. 6, 1976);
Harless v. McCartney, No. 76-0293-CH (S.D.W. Va., filed Sept. 30, 1976); McCarthy v.
Hardy, 420 F. Supp. 410 (E.D. La. 1976); McCarthy v. Kirkpatrick, 420 F. Supp. 366
(W.D. Mo. 1976); McCarthy v. Noel, 420 F. Supp. 799 (D.R.I. 1976); McCarthy v. Trib-
bitt, 421 F. Supp. 1193 (D. Del. 1976); McCarthy v. Askew, 420 F. Supp 775 (S.D. Fla.
1976); McCarthy v. Exon, 427 F. Supp. 1143 (D. Neb. 1976); McCarthy v. Austin, 423 F.
Supp. 990 (W.D. Mich. 1976); McCarthy v. Lunding, No. 76-C-2733 (N.D. Ill., filed Aug.
6, 1976); McCarthy v. Shanahan, No. 76-237-C6 (D. Kan., filed June 17, 1976); Zapata v.
Davidson, 24 Cal. App. 3d 823, 101 Cal. Rptr. 438 (1972); McCarthy v. Secretary of
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on a ballot;' or in election financing cases, tenders an application-for
aid' to the bureaucratic official who is in charge of processing such
matters.' The official refuses to comply with the request and is in
Commonwealth, 371 Mass. 667, 359 N.E.2d 291 (1977); McCarthy v. Slater, 553 P.2d 489
(Okla. 1976); McCarthy v. Hassler, No. A-7991-II (Chancery Court, Davidson County,
Tenn., filed Sept. 22, 1976).
4. See Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, - U.S.
__, 99 S. Ct. 983 (1979); McCarthy v. Briscoe, 429 U.S. 1316 (1976); American Party
of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974); Lubin v.
Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); Jenness v. Fortson,
403 U.S. 431 (1971); Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S.
23 (1968); MacBride v. Exon, 558 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1977); MacBride v. Askew, 541 F.2d
465 (5th Cir. 1976); Communist Party v. State Bd. of Elections, 518 F.2d 517 (7th Cir.
1975); Jones v. Hare, 440 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1971); McCarthy v. Andrus, No. 1-76-191 (D.
Idaho filed Oct. 5, 1977); Cross v. Fong Eu, 430 F. Supp. 1036 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Rose v.
Hanly, No. 77-C-326 (N.D. Ill. filed Mar. 15, 1977); Ihlenfeldt v. State Election Bd., 425
F. Supp. 1361 (E.D. Wis. 1977); American Party v. Jernigan, 424 F. Supp. 943 (E.D.
Ark. 1977); Lendall v. Jernigan, 424 F. Supp. 951 (E.D. Ark. 1977); Ashworth v. Fort-
son, 424 F. Supp. 1178 (N.D. Ga. 1976); McCarthy v. Salmon, No. 76-C-213 (D.Vt., filed
Oct. 7, 1976); McCarthy v. Rampton, No. 76-C-303 (D. Utah, filed Oct. 6, 1976); Harless
v. McCartney, No. 76-0293-C4 (S.D.W. Va., filed Sept. 30, 1976); McCarthy v. Hardy,
420 F. Supp. 410 (E.D. La. 1976); McCarthy v. Kirkpatrick, 420 F. Supp. 366 (W.D. Mo.
1976); McCarthy v. Noel, 420 F. Supp. 799 (D.R.I. 1976); McCarthy v. Tribbitt, 421 F.
Supp. 1193 (D. Del. 1976); McCarthy v. Askew, 420 F. Supp. 775 (S.D. Fla. 1976); Mc-
Carthy v. Exon, 424 F. Supp. 1143 (D. Neb. 1976); McCarthy v. Austin, 423 F. Supp.
990 (W.D. Mich. 1976); McCarthy v. Lunding, No. 76-C-2733 (N.D. Ill., filed Aug. 6,
1976); McCarthy v. Shanahan, No. 76-237-C6 (D. Kan., filed June 17, 1976); Udall v.
Bowen, 419 F. Supp. 746 (S.D. Ind. 1976); Salera v. Tucker, 399 F. Supp. 1258 (E.D. Pa.
1975), affd, 424 U.S. 959 (1976); Lendall v. Bryant, 387 F. Supp. 397 (E.D. Ark. 1975);
Harper v. Vance, 342 F. Supp. 136 (N.D. Ala. 1972); King v. Willis, 333 F. Supp. 670 (D.
Del. 1971); Georgia Socialist Workers Party v. Fortson, 315 F. Supp. 1035 (N.D. Ga.
1970); Zapata v. Davidson, 24 Cal. App. 3d 823, 101 Cal. Rptr. 438 (1972); McCarthy v.
Secretary of Commonwealth, 371 Mass. 667, 359 N.E.2d 291 (1977); McCarthy v. Slater,
553 P.2d 489 (Okla. 1976); McCarthy v. Hassler, No. A-7991-II (Chancery Court, David-
son County, Tenn., filed Sept. 22, 1976).
5. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821
(D.C. Cir. 1975); McCarthy v. Kopel, No. C-76-45 (N.D. Iowa, filed Feb. 6, 1978, decided
April 4, 1978) (free lists of registered voters given exclusively to two largest parties);
Murray v. Norberg, 423 F. Supp. 795 (D.R.I. 1976); McKenna v. Reilly, 419 F. Supp.
1179 (D.R.I. 1976).
6. See, e.g., Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, -
U.S. __ , 99 S. Ct. 983 (1979) (Illinois Electoral Board); McCarthy v. Briscoe, 429 U.S.
1316 (1976) (Governor and Texas Secretary of State); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
(1976) (Secretary of the U.S. Senate, Clerk of the House, Comptroller General, At-
torney General, and the Federal Election Commission); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709
(1974) (Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder and Secretary of State of California);
Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969) (Illinois Electoral Board); Communist Party v.
State Bd. of Elections, 518 F.2d 517 (7th Cir. 1975) (Illinois Electoral Board); Jones v.
Hare, 440 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1971) (Michigan Secretary of State); McCarthy v. Kopel,
No. C-76-45 (N.D. Iowa, filed Feb. 6, 1978) (County Auditor and Commissioner of Elec-
tions, Iowa Attorney General, and Iowa Secretary of State); McCarthy v. Rampton,
No. 76-C-303 (D. Utah, filed Oct. 6, 1976) (Governor, Lieutenant Governor, and
1980]
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turn sued by the candidate who may be joined by electors who say
they would vote for the candidate.7 The candidate seeks declaratory
and injunctive relief' and, since 1976, attorney's fees.' The plaintiffs
in these cases are invariably individual persons or third parties, can-
didates for President or other federal or state offices, candidates for
presidential elector, and/or the registered electors of states; the
defendants are always public office holders or civil servants.
Generally, the plaintiffs have appeared pro se," or have been
represented by voluntary counsel." In one instance counsel for the
plaintiff was appointed by the court. 2 Defendants have been
represented by the appropriate attorney general's office. 3
The plaintiffs typically base their claims on behalf of their in-
dividual fundamental rights, and challenge the reasonableness of the
administrative ordering system presented by the statute which the
Secretary of State of Utah); Harper v. Vance, 342 F. Supp. 136 (N.D. Ala. 1972) (Chair-
man of State Democratic Executive Committee and Alabama Secretary of State); King
v. Willis, 333 F. Supp. 670 (D. Del. 1971) (Delaware State Election Commissioner and
Department of Elections); Zapata v. Davidson, 24 Cal. App. 3d 823, 101 Cal. Rptr. 438
(1972) (County Registrar of Voters).
7. See McCarthy v. Briscoe, 429 U.S. 1316 (1976); American Party of Texas
v. White, 415 U.S. 767, rek. denied. 416 U.S. 1000 (1974); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724
(1974); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971); Communist Party v. State Bd. of Elec-
tions, 518 F.2d 517 (7th Cir. 1975); McCarthy v. Tribbitt, 421 F. Supp. 1193 (D. Del.
1976); McCarthy v. Exon, 424 F. Supp. 1143 (D. Neb. 1976); McCarthy v. Austin, 423 F.
Supp. 990 (W.D. Mich. 1976); Salera v. Tucker, 399 F. Supp. 1258 (E.D. Pa. 1975), affd,
424 U.S. 959 (1976); Georgia Socialist Workers Party v. Fortson, 315 F. Supp. 1035
(N.D. Ga. 1970).
8. See generally cases cited in notes 2 and 3 supra.
9. See McCarthy v. Kopel, No. C-76-45 (N.D. Iowa, filed April 4, 1978) (state
ordered to pay plaintiff attorney's fees for successful challenge of Iowa election law
which limited indirect campaign aid to two largest parties); 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp.
1976) (as amended by Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976). But see McCarthy v.
Briscoe, 553 F.2d 1005, 1007 (5th Cir. 1977) (fees not awarded for unsuccessful
challenges).
10. See, e.g., Jones v. Hare, 440 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1971); Cross v. Fong Eu,
430 F. Supp. 1036 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Ashworth v. Fortson, 424 F. Supp. 1178 (N.D. Ga.
1976); Harless v. McCartney, No. 76-0293-CH (S.D.W. Va., filed Sept. 30, 1976); Lendall
v. Bryant, 387 F. Supp. 397 (E.D. Ark. 1975).
11. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Kopel, No. C-76-45 (N.D. Iowa, filed Feb. 6, 1978)
(voluntary counsel later awarded fees); McCarthy v. Rampton, No. 76-C-303 (D. Utah,
filed Oct. 6, 1976) (ACLU): McCarthy v. Noel, 420 F. Supp. 799 (D.R.I. 1976) (ACLU);
McCarthy v. Askew, 420 F. Supp. 775 (S.D. Fla. 1976) (ACLU); Zapata v. Davidson, 24
Cal. App. 3d 823, 101 Cal. Rptr. 438 (1972) (legal aid); McCarthy v. Hassler, No.
A-7991-II (Chancery Court, Davidson County, Tenn., filed Sept. 22, 1976).
12. See King v. Willis, 333 F. Supp. 670 (D. Del. 1971).
13. But see Ashworth v. Fortson, 424 F. Supp. 1178 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (Georgia
State Legal Dept.); Zapata v. Davidson, 24 Cal. App. 3d 823, 101 Cal. Rptr. 438 (1972)
(County Counsel).
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official has offered as authority for refusing the candidate's request.
The defendants argue for the fundamental interests of the whole
polity, and defend the particular degree to which the government
has chosen to impinge upon recognized substantive rights of the in-
dividual as necessary to the maintainance of orderly bureaucratic
processes.
The interests of political parties and organizations, whether
new or established, have been considered by the courts, but are con-
sistently subordinated to the rights of candidates and voters. No
decision involving a recognized party interest has identified a Con-
stitutionally protected right capable of being held by a political
party organization as a legal person separate from the legal persons
of its members. Where party or organizational interests have been
protected, the courts have based their decisions on the states' rights
to maintain order in the electoral process, or upon voter's or can-
didate's rights to effectively participate in elections.
To preserve these substantive rights, plaintiffs assert that the
enforcement of particular state laws denies them the "equai protec-
tion of laws" as guaranteed by the fifth and fourteenth amendments
to the United States Constitution;" and the courts at all levels, state
and federal, generally resolve these challenges with an application
of that clause. 5 Due process standards are mentioned in the opinions
of several courts, but no election case opinion contains more than a
general affirmation of the principle that measures taken by states to
secure important or substantial interests must be specifically
directed to the realization of the states' goals and may not be vague
or ambiguous."'
THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION RIGHTS:
THE Two TIER ANALYSIS
In its ballot access and election funding decisions, the Supreme
Court has principally discussed these personal rights:"7 the right to
14. But see Murray v. Norberg, 423 F. Supp. 795, 800-01 (D.R.I. 1976) (alleged
that tax checkoff fund distribution statute was misleading and denied due process by
being vague).
15. But see McCarthy v. Hardy, 420 F. Supp. 410, 412 (E.D. La. 1976). (In
response to plaintiffs' requests for information concerning nomination requirements,
the offices of both the Secretary of State and Attorney General of Louisiana supplied
incorrect information. The district court held the State of Alabama was estopped from
asserting correct requirements to refuse McCarthy access to the ballot.)
16. See note 14 supra.
17. In the third party and independent cases the only other right discussed is
a first amendment right to "free discussion of governmental affairs" which logically in-
1980]
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vote,18 the right to associate for political purposes," and the right to
be a candidate for office."° Even though the Court has separately
identified and discussed these rights, it has also declared them to be
inextricably intertwined. 1 The Court has further complicated mat-
ters by saying voting and association are firmly established as fun-
damental personal rights guaranteed by the Constitution' while the
right to be a candidate is not."' (The Court serves us a Waldorf
salad, but insists that we separate on our plates the apples and
walnuts from the celery). Any alleged interference with fundamental
rights is subjected to "close scrutiny," a standard which in effect
shifts both the burden of going forward with the evidence and the
burden of proof to a state-defendant. When it is claimed that a
statute interferes with non-fundamental rights, it may be declared
to be constitutionally sound if it can be said to have a rational
basis.' Applying a rational basis test to an asserted right of can-
didacy places the characterization of that right within the states' ad-
ministrative discretion; the plaintiff having to show that the par-
ticular state action in question would lead to absurd results in every
possible sequence of circumstances in order to win the case, 5 an ex-
tremely difficult burden of proof.
volves free press as well as free speech rights. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976).
The Court has connected assembly rights to free speech rights. NAACP v. Alabama,
357 U.S. 449, 460 (1967).
18. See Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, - U.S.
__ 99 S. Ct. 983. 990 (1979); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, (1976); American Party of
Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 795, reh. denied, 416 U.S. 1000 (1974); Storer v. Brown,
415 U.S. 724, 729-30 (1973); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 713 (1973); Bullock v. Carter,
405 U.S. 134, 142-43 (1972); Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 818 (1969); Williams v.
Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968).
19. Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, __ U.S. __ ,
99 S. Ct. 983, 990 (1979); American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 771, reh.
denied, 416 U.S. 1000 (1974); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 729 (1973); Lubin v. Panish,
415 U.S. 709, 713-16 (1974); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 29, 30 (1968).
20. See Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 718 (1973); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S.
134, 143 (1972); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 29, 32, 36 (1968).
21. See Lubin v. Panish. 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1973) (right to vote and right of
party or candidate to place on ballot); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972) (rights
of voters and rights of candidates); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 29, 30-31 (1968) (right
to associate for the advancement of political beliefs and right to vote are "different but
overlapping").
22. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 29, 30 (1968).
23. Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1973); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134,
142-43 (1972). See generally Gordon, The Constitutional Right to Candidacy, 25 KAN. L.
REV. 545 (1977). But see Sims, Discrimination in State Election Laws Against Third
Party and Independent Candidates, 6 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 155, 163-66 (1974).
24. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143-44 (1972).
25. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 221-22 (1976). See note 27 infra.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 3 [1980], Art. 3
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Using the "two-tier test" the nature of the constitutional right
at issue is supposed to determine the court's standard of review,"
but clearly the outcome is determined by the choice of standard." If
the Court really believed in the two-tier test, then candidacy, a non-
fundamental right,8 would be "inextricably intertwined" with fun-
damental rights of voting and association. The uncertain career of
the two-tier test is a topic too big for our essay. We simply make
the observation that since Bullock v. Carter" the Court has, as a
matter of fact, closely scrutinized every election case where can-
didacy has been an issue."
Beyond the problem posed by unseparate and unequal treat-
ment of these rights, the use of the term "fundamental rights" has
been confused in two other ways. First, when "fundamental rights"
are opposed to state "interests","' there is an implication that peo-
26. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 142-44 (1972).
27. Justice Thurgood Marshall has claimed that the jurisprudential separation
of rights into two classes of interests, fundamental and non-fundamental, with cor-
responding modes of review, strict scrutiny and rational basis, is, in two of Marshall's
adjectives, "outdated and intellectually disingenuous." Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 457
(1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Marshall says that the court pretends to have two dif-
ferent types of review, and pretends that its determination of the type of review to be
applied in a given case does not also determine the final result of the case. Marshall
says that in every case of equal protection the choice of standards has determined the
outcome of the case. Where "strict scrutiny" has been held to be the mode of review
the statute complained of has been overturned. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 319 (1976). Where "rational basis" has been held to apply the
statute is nearly always upheld. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 457 (1977). Since the choice
of standards depends on the courts' decision as to whether an asserted right is fun-
damental, entailing strict scrutiny, or non-fundamental, requiring only a rational basis,
the outcome of equal protection cases turns on the courts' pigeon-holing of claims in
one of the two categories of rights. Marshall says the court clings to this fictional deci-
sion model in its opinions, but in fact ignores it. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement
v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318-21 (1976); San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1, 98-99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 90 (1971)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-21 (1970) (Marshall,
J., dissenting). See also Gunther, Foreword- In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court. A Model for Never Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV., 1, 17-20
(1972).
28. See generally Gordon, 25 KAN. L. REV., supra note 23.
29. 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
30. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); American Party of Texas v.
White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974); Lubin v. Panish, 415
U.S. 709 (1974); accord, Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 320
(1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
31. See also Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, -
U.S. __ , 99 S. Ct. 983, 992-93 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall's
criticisms of the impossible jargon of the two-tier test seem to have persuaded at least
one other member of the Court. Justice Blackmun says the term "compelling interest"
can be used to cover a variety of ad hoc or a posteriori decisions.
1980]
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ple's rights as individuals are somehow inherently more fundamen-
tal then their interest as members of the whole polity (though the
cases have never admitted that one interest could always be preferred
over the other). The Founding Fathers feared chaos could result from
both the excesses of individual liberty and the encroachments of
centralized state power. When they reviewed the histories of
political systems in a search of examples of the forms of government
with the greatest stability and endurance," they concluded that both
state and federal governments should be republics, whose form
should be neither radically anarchic nor radically authoritarian.'
(The 20th century has seen the social chaos that results from at-
tempts to decide an individual's rights in a particular instance solely
on the basis of what is supposed to be the interests of the whole
society).- Thus, according to the Founders, theories of fundamental
interests should be upheld regardless of which side wins one of
these election cases. When the plaintiff wins, it can be said that the
courts have declared that within the circumstances, the Constitu-
tional tradition supports a particular fundamental interest of the
people as individuals. When the defendants win, the circumstances
of the case can be said to have reaffirmed the reasonableness of a
legal norm offered by legislators or administrators as a positive ex-
pression of the fundamental interest of the people as a whole. Both
interests are fundamental; the courts' task is to decide against the
asserted interest which-within terms of the facts and circum-
stances pleaded at the bar-seriously threatens the greater quantity
of general values as expressed in the Constitution and elaborated by
constitutional litigation. As is often the case, the theory is simple,
but its application is not.
Second, the courts have used the term fundamental rights for
both the most general values stated in the Constitution and other
more specific constitutional statements. The most general values
may be called organic values. They are the undeniable rights of or-
dinary citizens and cannot be disputed unless one is willing to con-
template an abrupt change in the direction of the progress of
American constitutional thought, as well as significant changes in
the text of the Constitution itself. The principle organic value in-
volved in the election cases is the right to a "Republican Form of
32. See H. ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 226-29 (1963).
33. See THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 79, 226-27, 280-82, 431-33. (C. Rossiter ed.
1961) (Madison, Nos. 10, 37, 62; Hamilton, No. 72) [hereinafter THE FEDERALIST PAPERS];
R. HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 3-21 (1954).
34. See H. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R. 13-65 (1963); H. ARENDT, THE
ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 175-221 (1951).
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Government."35 Few would deny that the people have a right to
have "a voice in the election of those who make the laws.3 6
However, such statements are so general that there is rarely agree-
ment about how accurately or appropriately the right has been ex-
pressed by election statutes or by the principles that the Supreme
Court has offered to justify its election decisions. In our own coun-
try's relatively short experience with elective politics (relative to
the two millenia of western political experience which began with
the Greek city-republics) there have been majorities who, for a time,
successfully opposed extending this general proposition to include
small property holders, the propertyless, freedmen, the foreign
born, and women. Children, aliens, lunatics and convicted felons still
do not qualify as people within this general proposition. "Fundamen-
tal rights" is also used to describe Constitutional principles whose
articulation as "personal rights" and "legitimate state interests"
have, by the process of political and judicial testing, been settled to
such a firm degree that without more than ordinary knowledge of
their legislative and judicial histories, it is nearly impossible to
distinguish these principles from the general values from which they
were originally derived. Thus, the presumption that a competent
adult citizen is entitled to vote is now held with the same respect
traditionally accorded the more abstract value of preserving a
popular republic, although the right to vote was not explicitly men-
tioned in the Constitution until the fourteenth and fifteenth amend-
ments were added in 1868 and 1870.
To solve the problem of finding principles which can be applied
to regulate the association and disassociation of persons into
political parties and organizations, it is necessary to put aside the
obviously confused fundamental/non-fundamental right terminology.
Without too much difficulty a simple hierarchy can be hypothesized
by placing the most general organic value at the top and ranging
the principles below it depending on their degree of specificity. As
principles, the right to vote and the right to be a candidate are
subordinate to the right to associate, because they are politically im-
potent-even if scrupulously preserved-if the right to associate is
denied. 7
35. U.S. CONST. arts. I & II.
36. Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 721 (1974); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23,
31 (1968) citing Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1974). See Powell v. McCormack,
395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969).
37. The Founding Fathers were too busy practicing the realities of Enlighten-
ment Theory to engage in niceties about logic. See generally H. COMMAGER, THE EM-
PinE OF REASON (1977).
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THIRD-PARTY CANDIDATES AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL -
RIGHT TO ASSOCIATE
The Founders gave the people's pre-constitutional understand-
ing that they possessed a right to alter or abolish any form of
government destructive to the ends of life, liberty, and the pursuit
of happiness"a a more particular political form and procedural struc-
ture in those sections of the Constitution which set out how govern-
ments shall be determined. The Congress, and ultimately the Presi-
dent, are chosen "by the People of the Several States." 9 In turn,
this government guarantees that the states shall have a "Republican
Form of Government.' '
James Madison explained what a republic is:
[W]e may define a republic to be, or at least may bestow
that name on, a government which derives all its powers
directly or indirectly from the great body of the people,
and is administered by persons holding their offices dur-
ing pleasure for a limited period, or during good behavior.
It is essential to such a government that it be derived
from the great body of the society, not from an incon-
siderable portion or a favored class of it; otherwise, a
handful of tyrannical nobles, exercising their oppressions
by a delegation of their powers, might aspire to the rank
of republicans and claim for their government the honor-
able title of republic. It is sufficient for such a govern-
ment that the persons administering it be appointed,
either directly or indirectly by the people; and that they
hold their appointments by either of the tenures just
specified; otherwise, every government in the United
States, as well as every other popular government that
has been or can be well organized or well executed, would
be degraded from the republic character . ... ,
How the government shall be chosen is a subject of four of the Con-
stitution's seven articles and nine of its twenty-six amendments.' 2
Court opinions in the third-party and independent election
cases are full of general remarks reflecting a recognition that the
assertion of a Constitutional right places some responsibility on
38. See The Declaration of Independence.
39. U.S. CONST. arts. I & II.
40. U.S. CONST. art. IV.
41. THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 33, (No. 39) at 241.
42. U.S. CONST. arts. I, II, IV, V; amends. XII, XIV, XV, XVII, XIX, XXII,
XXIII, XXIV, XVI.
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them for preventing the "degradation of the republic. 4 3 These
statements, though they are one step removed from the declared
principles of the right to vote and associate which are used to decide
the controversies of the case, inform and condition the judges'
reasoning.
When persuaded that it is faced with the alternatives of either
condoning a "degradation of the republic", or rearranging and re-
arguing the principles in its opinion so that they spontaneously
generate a new principle, a court will find that new principle in the
precedents; even if its opinion must argue for what is reasonable to
conclude rather than for what is implied by the precedents. In the
independent third party election cases, the Court's references to the
interrelationship of voting, association, and candidacy are examples
of how apparently rigid limits are intentionally blurred when it
seems necessary to prevent the "degradation of the republic.""
Although "a republican form of government" is guaranteed to
the states by the Constitution,45 the Supreme Court has repeatedly
declared that the courts have no jurisdiction over a claim based on
this section. According to the Court, defining an appropriate
republican form is a nonjusticiable political question." To avoid a
43. E.g., "A fundamental principle of our representative democracy is, in
Hamilton's words 'that the people should choose whom they please to govern them', 2
Elliot's Debates 257." McCarthy v. Austin, 423 F. Supp. 990, 995 (W.D. Mich. 1976)
citing Powell v. McCormack 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969); "No right is more precious in a
free country than that of having voice in the election of those who make the laws
under which, as good citizens, we live." Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968),
citing Wesberry v. Sanders, 370 U.S. 1, 17 (1964); "Free and honest elections are the
very foundation of our republican form of government." McDougall v. Green, 335 U.S.
281, 288 (1948) (Douglas, J., dissenting); "As long as ours is a representative form of
government, and our legislatures are those instruments of government elected directly
by and directly representative of the people, the right to elect legislators in a free and
unimpaired fashion is a bedrock of our political system." Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709,
714 (1974), citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964); "Statutes distributing the
franchise constitute the foundation of our representative society. Any unjustified
discrimination in determining who may participate in political affairs or in the selec-
tion of public officials undermines the legitimacy of representative government."
Kramer v. Free Union School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969); "[A state may not] freeze
the status quo but [must] recognize the Potential Fluidity of American Political Life."
American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 787 (1974), citing Jenness v. Fortson,
403 U.S. 431, 439 (1971).
44. Accord, Ely, On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARv. L. REV. 5, 5-6
(1978); Ely, Towards a Representation-Reinforcing Mode of Judicial Review, 37 MD. L.
REV. 451, 452-54 (1978).
45. U.S. CONST. art. IV.
46. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). See Stokes v. Fortson, 234 F. Supp. 575,578
(W.D. Pa. 1963); Sims, 6 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV., supra note 23, at 158-60.
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complex discussion of "political questions" it is perhaps sufficient to
say that some of the Constitution's statements of organic values are
by their nature too controversial to be acceptably defined by a
judicial system limited to the adjudication of cases and controver-
sies. That, and the Court pragmatically forbids itself from crossing a
line it has defined for itself. However, not all the values stated in
the Constitution are so general as to be incapable of being given
reasonably clear meanings by other less open ended language in the
Constitution. The rights of voting, assembly, free speech and peti-
tion explain and give structure to the general ideal of a republic in-
herent in the American Constitution without rigidly imposing a par-
ticular set of mechanical administrative rules (which are always the
actual objects of legal controversy). These rights can be given new
common sense applications without changes in their wording. But
while malleable, these rights are firm enough to be used as stand-
ards to measure disputed administrative rules, which are brittle and
relatively unadaptable.
The rules which have been challenged prohibited independent
candidates from getting on the ballot (by failing to provide a
statutory process for doing so), 7 demanded they present petitions
signed by a percentage 8 (worked out and qualified in various ways)
of the eligible electors in a voting district, 9 demanded that in-
dependents from a political party or organization nominate them'
and precluded losing candidates in party primaries from running as
independents.'
47. See McCarthy v. Briscoe, 429 U.S. 1317, 1320 (1976) (Texas); MacBride v.
Askew, 541 F.2d 465, 467 (5th Cir. 1976) (Florida); McCarthy v. Tribbitt, 421 F. Supp.
1193, 1198 (D. Del. 1967); McCarthy v. Exon, 424 F. Supp. 1143, 1145 (D. Neb. 1976);
McCarthy v. Askew, 420 F. Supp. 775, 779 (S.D. Fla. 1976).
48. Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, - U.S. -,
99 S. Ct. 983, 989 (1979); Jones v. Hare, 440 F.2d 685, 686 (6th Cir. 1971); McCarthy v.
Salmon, No. 76-213 (D. Vt., filed Oct. 7, 1976); Cross v. Fong Eu, 430 F. Supp. 1036,
1039-41 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Udall v. Bowen, 419 F. Supp. 746, 748 (S.D. Ind. 1976); Salera
v. Tucker, 399 F. Supp. 1258, 1266 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Lendall v. Bryant, 387 F. Supp. 397,
403 (E.D. Ark. 1975); Georgia Socialist Workers Party v. Fortson, 315 F. Supp. 1035,
1040 (1970).
49. E.g., American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 788 (1973) (peti-
tioners' signers must swear not to vote in primaries); Harless v. McCartney, No.
76-0293-CH (S.D.W. Va., filed Sept. 20, 1976) (independent candidate's supporters could
not solicit signatures outside their own magisterial district, petition signers forego
right to vote in a party primary).
50. See American Party v. Jernigan, 424 F. Supp. 943, 945 (E.D. Ark. 1977);
McCarthy v. Austin, 423 F. Supp. 990, 998 (W.D. Mich. 1976); McCarthy v. Slater, 553
P.2d 489, 491 (Okla. 1976); McCarthy v. Hassler, No. A-7991-11 (Chancery Court, David-
son County, Tenn., filed Sept. 22, 1976).
51. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 734-35 (1974); Salera v. Tucker, 399 F.
Supp. 1258, 1268 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
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Third-party candidates have challenged regulations requiring
percentages and geographical spreading of petition signatures 2 or a
particular organizational structure ' and regulations limiting the
ability of voters to change party affiliations.' Both independents and
third parties have challenged regulations excluding them from elec-
tion funding schemes,5 regulations requiring particular time periods
and sequences for the performance of acts necessary for ballot ac-
cess, and regulations setting the physical placement of candidate
names on the ballots and the styles of descriptions attached to can-
didate names. 7 Beyond particular statutory provisions, courts have
examined the totality of a state's election laws" and scrutinized the
exercise of administrative discretion by various agencies with power
to affect election procedures. 5
Whether the disputed measures have withstood challenge or
have been swept away by the courts, and seemingly regardless of
the actual merits of the plaintiff's complaint, the reasons and
arguments offered in defense of ballot regulations have been mere
repetitions of prior court pronouncements about the interests which
states have in regulating the electoral process.
52. See American Party v. Texas, 415 U.S. 767, 773-75 (1974); Communist
Party v. State Bd. of Elections, 518 F.2d 517, 518 (1975); American Party v. Jernigan,
424 F. Supp. 943, 946 (E.D. Ark. 1977); Georgia Socialist Workers Party v. Fortson, 315
F. Supp. 1035, 1037 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
53. American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 781 (1973); King v.
Willis, 333 F. Supp, 670, 672 (D. Del. 1971) (law required parties to hold a national con-
vention, nominate candidates for all state wide offices, and elect a state committee).
54. American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 786 (1973); Nader v.
Schaffer, 417 F. Supp. 837, 848 (D. Conn. 1976); Salera v. Tucker, 399 F. Supp. 1258,
1264 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
55. See cases cited in note 2 supra.
56. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968); MacBride v. Exon, 558
F.2d 443, 448 (8th Cir. 1977); McCarthy v. Kirkpatrick, 420 F. Supp. 366, 373 (W.D. Mo.
1976); McCarthy v. Noel, 420 F. Supp. 799, 803 (D.R.I. 1976); Salera v. Tucker, 399 F.
Supp. 1258, 1266 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
57. See American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 794-95 (1973) (only
major party candidate names placed on absentee ballots); Ihlenfeldt v. State Election
Bd., 425 F. Supp. 1361, 1364 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (independents and minor parties placed
in column marked independent); McCarthy v. Kirkpatrick, 420 F. Supp. 366, 375 (W.D.
Mo. 1976) (presidential electors names, but not those of independent candidates ap-
peared on ballot).
58. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
59. See McCarthy v. Salmon, No. 76-213 (D. Vt., filed Oct. 7, 1976) (candidate
complied with all Vermont laws but town clerks failed to certify petition signatures by
deadline); McCarthy v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 371 Mass. 667, 359 NE 2d 291,
294 (1977) (candidate complied with all Massacusetts laws but Secretary of Com-
monwealth required candidate to prove validity of petition signatures).
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Similarly, with rare exceptions, the courts' opinions repeat, in
part or whole, a standard litany of truisms." A state has an interest
in the "stability of the political system""' and in avoiding "chaos. 62
A state may regulate the electoral process to "preserve the integ-
rity of the electoral process,"" or to "promote fairness, efficiency
and the orderly operation of election machinery."" More particularly,
states have an interest in "providing the electorate with an
understandable ballot" 5 so they may "avoid confusion, deception and
even the frustration of the democratic process at the general elec-
tion." States can regulate the ballot to "prevent clogging," "avoid
frivolous or fraudulent candidacies," 7 and assure that the winner is
elected by a majority, not a plurality." A state has a legitimate in-
terest in preventing "splintered parties and unrestrained fac-
tionalism," 9 and may require primary elections to "winnow out the
candidates"70 as well as "restrain independent candidates prompted
by short-range political goals, or personal quarrel."71 A state may
"curb ballot flooding,"72  "prevent 'laundry list' ballots which
60. The Court reiterated nearly all of these in Illinois State Bd. of Elections
v. Socialist Workers Party, __ U.S. - , 99 S. Ct. 983, 991 (1979).
61. McCarthy v. Noel, 420 F. Supp. 799, 802 (D.R.I. 1976); McCarthy v.
Austin, 423 F. Supp. 990, 996 (W.D. Mich. 1976); Salera v. Tucker, 399 F. Supp. 1258,
1263 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
62. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1973); Lendall v. Jernigan, 424 F.
Supp. 951, 955 (E.D. Ark. 1977).
63. American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 783 n.1 (1973); Ashworth
v. Fortson, 424 F. Supp. 1178, 1181 (N.D. Ga. 1976); Harless v. McCartney, No.
76-0293-CH (S.D. W. Va., filed Sept. 30, 1976); McCarthy v. Noel, 420 F. Supp. 799, 802
(D.R.I. 1976); McCarthy v. Tribbitt, 421 F. Supp. 1193, 1198 (D. Del. 1976).
64. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1973); Lendall v. Jernigan, 424 F.
Supp. 951, 953, (E.D. Ark. 1977).
65. Salera v. Tucker, 399 F. Supp. 1258, 1263 (E.D. Pa. 1975), citing Williams
v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32-33 (1968).
66. American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 782 n.14 (1973); Jenness
v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971).
67. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 135 (1972); MacBride v. Askew, 558 F.2d
442, 448 (8th Cir. 1977); Lendall v. Jernigan, 424 F. Supp. 951, 954 (E.D. Ark. 1977); Mc-
Carthy v. Tribbitt, 421 F. Supp. 1193, 1198 (D. Del. 1976); McCarthy v. Austin, 423 F.
Supp. 990, 997 (W.D. Mich. 1976); Lendall v. Bryant, 387 F. Supp. 397, 402 (E.D. Ark.
1975).
68. Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 712-13 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S.
134, 145 (1972); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968); Salera v. Tucker, 399 F.
Supp. 1258, 1263 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
69. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736 (1973).
70. Id. at 735.
71. Id.
72. Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 713 (1974).
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discourage voter participation and frustrate participants,"" keep
"publicity seekers off ballots,"7' and reserve the ballot for "serious
candidates" who have demonstrated a "modicum of community sup-
port." 5 A state has an interest in easing its administrative
burdens." Finally, it is an appropriate use of "public money to
facilitate and enlarge public discussion and participation in the elec-
toral process." 7
Although the courts may be criticized for their unimaginative
prose, their opinions are nonetheless based on common-sensical
observations about the realities of electioneering. We considered
those observations, together with the list of identified personal
rights and the confusion created by the two-tier system (the retreat
from which a majority of the Court has yet to acknowledge), and
Madison's definition of a republic as clues to the identity of the basic
theorem. An additional clue from jurisprudence persuaded us that
association is the correct choice.
GIERKE'S THEORY OF ASSOCIATION AND ELECTION RIGHTS
The personal right of association, as the value upon which the
other democratic values depend, was discussed by a writer
dedicated to the ideal of democracy and freedom within a stabilized
political order, Otto Friedrich Von Gierke.7 ' Gierke's notions about
association are in perfect harmony with almost every statement
which judges have made concerning the Constitution and elections
73. McCarthy v. Briscoe, 429 U.S. 1317, 1323 (1976); Cross v. Fong Eu, 430 F.
Supp. 1036, 1040 (N.D. Cal. 1977): Ashworth v. Fortson, 424 F. Supp. 1178, 1181 (N.D.
Ga. 1976).
74. Udall v. Brown, 419 F. Supp. 746, 749 (S.D. Ind. 1976).
75. American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 782 n.14 (1973); Storer v.
Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 735 (1973); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971); Cross v.
Fong Eu, 430 F. Supp. 1036, 1039 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Ihlenfeldt v. State Election Bd., 425
F. Supp. 1361, 1364 (E.D. Wis. 1977); Ashworth v. Fortson, 424 F. Supp. 1178, 1181
(N.D. Ga. 1976); Harless v. McCartney, No. 76-0293-CH (S.D.W. Va., Sept. 30, 1976); Mc-
Carthy v. Kirkpatrick, 420 F. Supp. 336, 373 (W.D. Mo. 1976); McCarthy v. Tribbitt,
421 F. Supp. 1193, 1197 (D. Del. 1976); McCarthy v. Austin, 423 F. Supp. 990, 995 (W.D.
Mich. 1976).
76. See Cross v. Fong Eu, 430 F. Supp. 1036, 1042 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (vote
counting resources); Ashworth v. Fortson, 424 F. Supp. 1178, 1181 (N.D. Ga. 1976); Mc-
Carthy v. Salmon, No. 76-213 (D. Vt., filed Oct. 6, 1976); Harless v. McCartney, No.
76-0293-CH (S.D.W. Va., filed Sept. 20, 1976) (verify signatures, print ballots, litigate
challenges); McCarthy v. Kirkpatrick, 420 F. Supp. 366, 373 (W.D. Mo. 1976) (verify
signatures); Salera v. Tucker, 399 F. Supp. 1258, 1267 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (print ballots,
resolve challenges to signatures).
77. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1. 92-93 (1976).
78. See generally 0. GIERKE, ASSOCIATIONS AND LAW (G. Heiman trans. 1977).
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and every argument made by the litigants. We are mindful of the
warnings of Holmes and others and make no attempt to establish
causal links between what the courts have done and Gierke's
theories. But Gierke's theory of association and the courts' opinions
do tend to support our claim that the constitutional rights involved
in elections equally depend on the right to associate for their ex-
istence as meaningful rights. If we must talk of "fundamental"
rights, the right to be a candidate is not less fundamental than
either of the other two.
Gierke did not bother with other writers' preoccupation with
the fiction of the state of nature and the task of deciding what is ra-
tionally necessary for man's progress from that state (where in-
dividuals are solitary and without social, political or legal ties)79 to
an organized community. Gierke begins by noting that historically,
as a matter of fact, individual humans have always lived in groups
and that human groups, whether large or small, are likely to be
either subdivided into smaller groups, be part of a larger group, and
overlap still others. A community, state, or nation is never a mere
sum of isolated individual persons; each society also contains in-
termediary associations. Individuals can only act effectively by join-
ing others or persuading others to join them. In Gierke's scheme,
which is an early step in the general direction of legal realism, laws
which regulate community life regulate not only the relation of the
individual to the whole of the community, but also regulate the rela-
tionships between the intermediate group, as well as with the com-
munity as a whole. The rights and obligations of individuals and
groups in the community are never merely those which are con-
ceded by the laws of the community, because neither the individual
nor groups of associations of individuals depend solely on the law
for their factual existence. Society is not created from the top down.
Gierke sees law as a device for stabilizing some of the relations be-
tween individuals, groups, and the community; not as the sole means
for creating social relationships."0 In Gierke's opinion, these na-
tural social bonds, which existed before the promulgation of laws
and which are made and unmade spontaneously without centralized
direction or control, are the result of natural processes. As such
79. E.g., T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, 183-8 (C.B. Macpherson ed. 1968).
80. Accord, Ely, 37 MD. L. REV.. supra note 44, at 453: "Warren Court ... in-
terventionism was fueled not by a desire on the part of the Court to vindicate par-
ticular substantive values it had determined were important or fundamental, but
rather by a desire to ensure that the political process (which is where such values are
properly identified, weighed, and accommodated) was open to those of all viewpoints
on an equal basis."
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they have a natural law claim to legitimacy which ordinarily takes
precedence over positive laws. He argues that the function of the
law-state's administration of power can extend no further than the
promulgation of positive measures which, in a contemporary
metaphor, control the chain reaction. The law-state may stop the
reaction but is incapable of ordering its sequence or direction; the
law-state's sole reason for existence is to prevent an explosion by
controlling the pace of interreaction. Taken to extremes, laws which
limit the right of association by defining an excessive number of pro-
hibited associations, or worse still, by prohibiting all save specifi-
cally allowed or required associations, because they tend to stifle
individual natural tendencies, can only be imposed by force. A law-
state whose positive laws depend solely on force for their effec-
tiveness has lost the right to be called a state of laws."l Similarly,
where there is no law-state protection of certain traditional kinds of
associations, the more powerful associations are soon tempted to for-
cibly eliminate weaker ones and are in turn subject to subversion and
forcible overthrow. Individual rights are destroyed in both cir-
cumstances. Thus, the right to vote or the right to be a candidate
cannot be considered without also considering their material effect
on the right to associate. Nor can the right to associate be discussed
outside the context of the historical realities of electioneering.82
In the context of the ballot access and election financing cases,
the suppression of minor parties or independents suppresses the
spontaneous formation of new political associations either directly or
indirectly. Yet it is also true that wearing the guise of new associa-
tions for new political purposes, independents and third parties have
set out, not with the intention of offering new perspectives or pro-
grams, but with the intention of sabotaging the processes of associa-
tion whereby the majority parties have traditionally worked out
compromises among their adherents." For example, "dirty tricks"
are thus criminal in nature because they are intended to be frauds
on the individual participating in politics, whether actively or
merely as a voter, and are intended to deprive the individual of the
chance to make careful and considered decisions of how he or she will
associate on political issues. The ideal of free choice depends, of
course, on the presumption that all individuals are careful and
reasonable participants in the political processes. Even if, as a mat-
81. See note 91 infra.
82. See also D. Feilman, Constitutional Rights of Association, in FREE SPEECH
AND ASSOCIATION 23 (P. Kurland ed. 1975).
83. See, e.g., H. Arkes, Civility and the Restriction of Speechk Rediscovering
the Defamation of Groups, in FREE SPEECH AND ASSOCIATION 930 (P. Kurland ed. 1975).
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ter of fact, many examples can be shown where a majority of the in-
dividuals in polity have been totally indifferent to, ignorant of, or ir-
rational about political issues, the laws cannot patronize these in-
dividuals without also patronizing those who are concerned,
knowledgeable and reasonable and who would like to participate in
the electoral processes.
For whatever reasons, historically two parties have always
dominated U.S. political life (perhaps only for the reason that every
proposed legislative action must, at its simplest terms, be either en-
dorsed or opposed) and there is no third party which has continually
presented a clearly distinct identity, philosophy, or program appeal-
ing to more than a very small minority of the electorate. 4 The
history of third parties also shows that some third parties have been
no more than disaffected minorities of major parties. Their indepen-
dent posture is taken for the sole purpose of extorting concessions
from the majority not otherwise obtainable.15 History makes it
reasonable to suspect the motives of third parties and inde-
pendents." However, it is not because a party is a third, fourth, or
even fifth party, or because a candidate runs as an independent that
these candidacies draw suspicion, but because the party or can-
didate is new. It is difficult, if not impossible, to know whether such
candidacies are offered as serious alternatives and serious attempts
to gain the association and support of individual voters or are
merely attempts to manipulate the electorate.
The courts have recognized that the election ballot is not sup-
posed to be the stage where political activity begins and is not sup-
posed to be the first or only time a voter may associate himself or her-
self with a candidate or party. 7 In contrast, in political systems where
open political controversy is not permitted" and political activity is
limited to the casting of votes, voting is more properly described as
participating in a ceremonial exercise than as the exercising of a
free choice. In such circumstances those in power use the ap-
84. See Sims, 6 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV.. supra note 23, at 155-57.
85. E.g. Teddy Roosevelt's Bull Moose Party and Strom Thurmond's Dix-
iecrats.
86. Cf. Sims, 6 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV., supra note 23 (third parties in-
clude the Anti-Masonic, Vegetarian, Loco Foco, Prohibition, Vote for Jesus, and Raza
Unida parties).
87. See Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, __ U.S.
-, 99 S. Ct. 983, 991 (1979), citing American Party of Texas v. White 415 U.S. 767,
786-87 (1974), and Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 715 (1974).
88. See H. BERMAN, supra note 34, at 52-53, 374-75.
89. Id. at 374.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 3 [1980], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol14/iss3/3
FUNDAMENTAL ELECTION RIGHTS
pearance of law to mask the forcible subordination of all to the will
of one particular association."° The first amendment guarantees of
the right of free speech and the right to petition government are
like the right to vote. They ensure that the more basic principle of
free association for political purposes can be realized and are no less
intertwined with the right of association. Neither right has any
meaning if association is not protected. Free association ensures
that an individual does not have to face the government alone."
The courts say the ballot is reserved for deciding major con-
troversies and represents an attempt to peaceably compromise the
wills of major segments of the polity who have been otherwise
unable to work out a consensus." Thus, while the ballot may be a
substitute for a violent struggle, it is never a substitute for political
association. To admit third parties and independents to this final
resolution without a showing of some community support would im-
pute to them associational persuasiveness they did not possess. It
would also threaten the authority of the election as a means of
peacefully resolving major questions. For example, a third party or
independent might, simply by being placed on the ballot, draw
enough votes to prevent the determination of a clear majority and
thereby cripple the authority of the plurality winner. 3
Preserving the integrity of the election process means an in-
dividual candidate may not be allowed to completely avoid political
association and yet be treated equally with an individual who has
persuaded many others to associate with him or her and support his
or her candidacy. An independent candidate does not avoid political
association, but seeks to gain the association of electors on the basis
of personal qualities and characteristics rather than a defined
90. 1&
91. [We] are today again confronted with political systems which must be
qualified partly or wholly as terror-states- although they display a constitutional
facade and even catalogues of constitutional freedoms- in view of all of this, it seems
to me that the need for a material idea of the law state is urgent. It will have to be an
idea that breaks through the formal-juridical frames of the state constitution and gets
down to the fundamental, material principles of public and private law, which deter-
mines the inner limits of the power of the state in relation to non-state social speeches.
[S]tates which boast of being "people's democracies", but which in fact suppress free ex-
pression of political opinion and free association, completely deny ...the principle of
representation, which is a fundamental to the law state. H.J. van Eikema Hommes, The
Idea of the Law State and the Future of Society, ARCHIV FUR RECHTSUND SOZIAL
PHILOSOPHIE, Beiheft II, 133, 136 (1979).
92. E.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 735 (1973).
93. The three way electoral split which resulted in Lincoln's election is an ex-
ample.
1980]
Ahrens and Hauserman: Fundamental Election Rights: Association, Voting, and Candidacy
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1980
484 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 14
political philosophy, program or issue." A candidate who runs in-
dependently is not bound to respect any particular body of opinion,
however wisely held or carefully worked out. He or she has no real
political constituency because there is no stable consensus between
the independent candidate and those who support such a candidacy.
A candidate who achieves office on such a basis, and who lacks the
qualities necessary to be the object of a cult of personality, must
understand the isolation and insecurity of his or her position. On the
other hand, persons with a cult following may be tempted to exceed
their authorized powers and substitute personal authority for the
authority of law. 5
One may expect that independents are rarely elected when
traditional political associations are healthy and functioning to distill
opinions and formulate interests. One should also expect that a can-
didate elected without the endorsement of a strong party may at-
tempt to weaken parties still further by destroying or hindering
their abilities to associate." The operatives who perform such tasks
should not be confused with citizens freely associating and support-
ing one of themselves as a first among equals. 7 Awareness of the
potential for deception justifies protections, though such awareness
need not and should not preclude admission to the ballot.
Individuals, groups, and the state have an interest in prevent-
ing political associations from being manipulated as the tools of in-
dividuals, and individuals from being the slaves of the associations.
In ballot access and election financing cases this means protecting
the independent and third party candidates' access to the process
while protecting traditional political associations from murder, if not
from senescence and their eventual natural demise. 8
CONCLUSION
This history of the Court's application of Constitutional values
is evidence that its and the litigants' efforts to ensure against the
94. See Ashworth v. Fortson, 424 F. Supp. 1178, 1183 (N.D. Ga. 1976); McCar-
thy v. Tribbitt, 421 F. Supp. 1193, 1198 (D. Del. 1976); McCarthy v. Austin, 423 F.
Supp. 990, 998 (W.D. Mich. 1976); McCarthy v. Slater, 553 P.2d 489, 492 (Okla. 1976).
95. George Washington was an independent and the subject of a cult of per-
sonality, yet exercised extraordinary restraint as president. See generally P.
KURLAND, WATERGATE AND THE CONSTITUTION 165-66 (1978).
96. See id at 188-89.
97. Id.
98. One "hopeless" campaign by an independent had other goals besides win-
ning. See Armor & Marcus, The Bloodless Revolution of 1976, 63 A.B.A.J. 1109-12
(1977); see also McCarthy, Unconstitutional Support of the Two-Party System, 21 LoY.
L. REV. 663 (1975).
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degradation of the republic have steadily expanded the framework
of recognized rights. Constitutional precedents never permanently
stall this development. They can be used to prove that a right has
been historically recognized or that a new argument's claim has not
yet been accepted. They cannot be used to prove conclusively that a
claim ought not be recognized. Every new recognition should be the
culmination of a process of argument about the basic values underly-
ing the foundation of the state, the experience of law which has
become traditional, and the facts in the particular case before the
court. New arguments must be skeptically approached and reargued
until their propositions are either demolished of become com-
monplace. It is too early to say that the right to be a candidate has
become so commonplace, but we can find no good reasons in the
facts of these cases to say it should not be considered an integral
part of the electoral process. It cannot be disputed that it is directly
implied by the right of political association, the prime principle. Un-
til the Court formally abandons the two-tier system, it should treat
the right to be a candidate no differently than rights to association
and its other corollaries, voting, free speech, or petition.
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